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“If there were a verb meaning "to believe 
falsely," it would not have any significant first 
person, present indicative.”  
- Ludwig Wittgenstein 
   
Linguistic deterministic theory proposes that tensed 
complements structure and prepare children’s ability to 
understand that others can have beliefs that might not be 
true, a so-called Theory of Mind (ToM). Others found that 
training production of mental verbs advanced four-to-five 
year-olds’ ToM. In this pilot study 46 pre-schoolers 
completed a programme consisting of 16 intervention 
sessions, during which all children were read stories 
enriched with tensed complements. After the story reading, 
half of the children were trained in the active production of 
tensed complements. The trained children did not differ from 
the children that were passively exposed to tensed 
complements. This renders no support to the role of active 
production of such complements in ToM development. The 
findings lead to questioning of the concept of ToM as well as 
its relation to language. 
 
Keywords: Theory of Mind, language, tensed complements, mental 
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1 Introduction 
This paper sets out to – through philosophical glasses – 
investigate the psychological impact of linguistic training on 
the social competencies of 3-6 year old pre-schoolers, more 
precisely on their so-called Theory of Mind (ToM).   
ToM refers to the gradually developing understanding of 
people as mental beings having knowledge, thoughts, 
desires, beliefs, intentions, and emotions and whose actions 
and interactions can be interpreted, explained, and predicted 
by taking these mental states into account. It is a cognitive 
achievement that enables us to express our propositional 
attitudes and to attribute such attitudes to others. It also helps 
us understand that we can hold beliefs about others and 
ourselves that might be false. In this way, ToM works as a 
social lubricant in many aspects of human life. 
Children’s awareness of, and reflection on, their own and 
others’ mental states help them develop positive relationships 
with teachers (Garner and Waajid, 2008) and peers (Banerjee 
and Watling, 2005). In turn, these positive relationships 
predict later academic achievements, (Buhs, Ladd and 
Herald, 2006; Davis, 2003; Hamre and Pianta, 2001; Ladd, 
Birch and Buhs, 1999; O’Connor and McCartney, 2006; 
Pianta and Stuhlman, 2004). Metacognition, a term coined by 
John Flavell in the 1970s, is another predictor of academic 
success. According to Flavell (2000), research on ToM and 
metacognition has been relatively “distinct and unconnected” 
(p. 17), although both investigate children’s knowledge about 
and understanding of mental states. The terms ToM and 
metacognition are sometimes used indiscriminately (Flavell, 
2000), but whereas ToM is about attributing attitudes to self 
and others and to use these attributions of mental states in 
our normal social intercourse, in planning, and in 
cooperation, metacognition is an introspective ‘knowing 
about knowing’. In Flavell’s own words: 
 
”Metacognition refers to one’s knowledge concerning 
one's own1 cognitive processes and products or anything 
related to them, e.g., the learning-relevant properties of 
information or data. For example, I am engaging in 
metacognition if I notice that I am having more trouble 
learning A than B; if it strikes me that I should double 
check C before accepting it as fact.” (1976, p. 232) 
 
Young children seem to be unclear about what it means 
for someone to know something and about how knowledge is 
acquired (Flavell and Miller, 1998). They are not aware that 
people experience mental states in an ever-flowing stream of 
consciousness. On the contrary, “they would ascribe no 
mental activity at all to a person who just sits quietly, 
‘waiting’”  (Flavell, 2004, p. 283). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  My emphasis. 
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Recent longitudinal research has demonstrated that early 
ToM acquisition can be considered as a precursor to later 
metacognition. In two longitudinal studies Lockl and 
Schneider (2006; 2007) found that both ToM and language 
competencies significantly predicted later metamemory, a 
term for knowledge about memory, also coined by Flavell in 
the early 70s, or what he calls “applied ToM” (Flavell, 
2000:17). Kuhn (1999) calls it “metastrategic knowing”. 
There is broad consensus that explicit ToM comes about 
around age four in typically developing children. The 
children now begin to realize that some have thoughts in the 
mind that might not be true2. If Max has not seen his mother 
removing his chocolate bar from the cupboard where he put 
it and the child has, the child would know that the belief Max 
holds, namely that the chocolate is still in the cupboard, is 
not in compliance with reality and therefore false. Before the 
age of four, children do not master this intentional shift of 
perspective, as evidenced by false-belief tests and other 
different perspective-taking tests (Perner and Roessler, 
2012). The question is: how do children come to this new 
understanding?  
There is substantial evidence of a strong correlation 
between language acquisition and the development of ToM 
(cf. Astington & Jenkins, 1999; Milligan, Astington, and 
Dack, 2007; Ruffman, Slade, Rowlandson, Rumsey, and 
Granham 2003; Slade and Ruffman, 2005; Villiers, J., 2007; 
de Villers, P., 2005), but opinions differ as to which causes 
which.  
1.1 Theoretical overview on language acquisition and the 
development of ToM 
Some claim that ToM is innate, but that every child has to go 
through certain stages to achieve a level of linguistic and 
cognitive development where ToM becomes evident (Piaget 
and Inhelder, 1969). According to Piaget (1937/1954), 
children learn the public language on the basis of private 
symbolic representations. The child adds to its knowledge 
(assimilation) until its existing conceptions get so shaken by 
new information that the child is forced to accommodate this 
new knowledge by revising its present representations in 
order to gain equilibrium (Piaget, 1945/1962). Through 
public language, peers challenge one another’s thoughts and 
thus advance each other’s cognitive development (Bandura, 
1986; Piaget, 1945/1962).  
Piaget’s genetic epistemology took science as the 
paradigm form of knowledge. Chomsky’s view of language 
acquisition as hypothesis testing further kindled the idea of 
small children as scientists (Leudar & Costall, 2004; Leudar, 
Costall and Frances, 2004). This may for the basis of today’s 
mainstream psychology, in which language is a natural way 
of providing the child with the information it needs to be able 
to understand that different people know, believe, and want 
different things. It theorizes that the child’s brain has a 
natural desire to learn, which makes the child think and act 
just like a scientist: it devises, tests and revises theories 
(Gopnik, 2004; Gopnik, 2009; Gopnik and Meltzoff, 1997). 
Based on progress in neuroscience, a recent model of active 
intermodal mapping (Meltzoff and Moore, 1997) proposes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Implicit ToM has been registered in infants (Chow and Poulin-Dubois, 
2009; Onishi and Baillargeon, 2005; Poulin-Dubois, Sodian, Tilden, Metz, 
& Schoepper, 2007; Surian, Caldi, and Sperber, 2007; Trevarthen and  
Aitken, 2001), but as this field of research by its very nature can only cover 
implicit ToM, it will not be discussed in this study which deals with explicit, 
elicited responses. 	  
an intrinsic supramodal connection in the infant brain 
between acts it observes and actions it executes. Through 
everyday experience the infant associates its own actions 
with its own underlying mental states. These associations 
between actions and internal experiences are stored in a 
belief-predicting, cognitive mechanism and then projected 
onto the person(s) performing similar actions. This 
matching-to-target process results in the infant beginning to 
develop an understanding of other people’s minds and 
mental states3. 
Other deny innateness and claim that ToM is built on 
cognitive processes that require language for their 
implementation, that children use semantic terms before they 
know the meaning of them and then acquire their meaning 
from use. In Vygotsky’s (1934/1994) account of cognitive 
development language is used in culture-bound social 
interactions. He argued that a lack of cultural context 
misleads us to hold causes of behaviour as residing within 
the child, rather than within its culture. On the contrary, 
during social interactions adults verbally interpret the child’s 
behaviour. Later, the child uses language to express control 
over others. Later still, the child controls its own actions by 
talking aloud to itself, so-called egocentric speech. Finally, 
speech is internalized and becomes thought4. In parallel with 
this, the capacity for self-monitoring and self-regulation 
develops through more knowledgeable others (ibid.). These 
individuals initially take responsibility for directing attention, 
setting goals, planning activities, and monitoring progress 
(other-regulation). As the child becomes increasingly 
competent of regulating his or her own cognitive activities, it 
gradually takes over the responsibility for these executive 
functions (self-regulation). 
Recent socio-cultural views on development are moving 
towards a discursive learning theory (Erneling, 2010; Hutto, 
2008). While admitting to the biological and genetic 
foundations of language production, it is suggested that 
language and ToM develop hand in hand as a package: 
“ …the development of language and the development of 
social skills are prior to, jointly causally sufficient, and 
individually causally necessary for the acquisition of ToM” 
(Garfield, Peterson and Perry, 2001).  
Cognition is plastic and shaped by language and language 
is an artefact created by the social environment (Erneling, 
2010; Tomasello, 1999).  Meaning thus emerges from social, 
communicative interaction and the sharing of meanings put 
constraints on individual meanings (Hoff and Naigles, 2002). 
Through the children’s social interaction with caregivers, 
teachers, and peers, the children are exposed to normative 
talk and narratives about mental states (cf. Erneling, 2010; 
Sinha and Jensen de López, 2000; Sinha, Thorseng, Hayashi, 
and Plunkett, 1994;). Lullabies, rhymes, stories, and triadic 
play all pave the way for the development of the folk 
psychological capacities that emerges in middle childhood 
(Sinha, 2009).  
Although more or less radical embodied or dynamic 
theories are gaining influence, many researchers hold on to 
the nativist language theories. As this study investigates the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Note	  that	  the	  AIM	  model	  is	  not	  a	  theory	  (of	  mind),	  but	  a	  (simulation)	  
model.	  4	  Andy Clark (2001) goes as far as to propose that without language we 
would not have thoughts (or exist as a species!): “For as soon as we 
formulate a thought in words (or on paper), it becomes an object for both 
ourselves and others … The process of linguistic formulation thus creates 
the stable structure to which subsequent thinking is attached” (p. 147).	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relation between language and ToM development, a brief 
introduction to this research follows below.  
1.2 Empirical background 
Studies show that children’s participation in conversation is 
critical to the development of ToM (Dunn, Brown, 
Slomkowski, Tesla, and Youngblade, 1991; Harris, 1999). 
Perner, Ruffman and Leekan (1994) showed that sibling 
constellation is another predictor of individual variation in 
ToM development. It has also been found that caregivers’ 
use of mentalistic language is consistently correlated to 
children’s early ToM development (Ruffman, Slade, and 
Crowe, 2002; Adrian, Clemente, Villanueva, and Rieffe, 
2005; Farrant, Maybery and Fletcher, 2012).    
Conversation may contribute to an understanding of 
perspective and mental states, but is it sufficient to allow for 
meta-representational interpretations of human behaviour? 
Some researchers argue that it is not. In his Language of 
Thought (LOT) theory, Fodor (1975) turns intentionality (i.e. 
the aboutness of a mental state) into propositional attitudes 
(beliefs and desires) in the sense that these attitudes figure as 
folk psychological explanations of behaviour: “he brought 
his umbrella because he expected that it was going to rain”. 
Here we have an attitude (“he expected”) followed by a 
proposition (“that it was going to rain”).  
Possibly picking up on Fodor’s LOT theory, linguists Jill 
and Peter de Villiers explored the syntactic aspects of the 
linguistic input to children and found that as language 
develops, it is the increased resources in syntactic structures 
that provide the format required for mentalistic 
representation. Consequently, they proposed a much-debated 
theory of linguistic determinism (1999; 2000). According to 
this, a specific aspect of syntax, namely tensed complements, 
structures and prepares the child for false-belief thinking.  
‘Tensed complements’ are full propositions embedded 
within sentences (cf. Fodor’s propositional attitudes 
described above) and ‘false-belief thinking’ is thinking about 
thoughts that might not be true. Even if psychologist Joseph 
Perner is one of the critics of certain details in the linguistic 
determinism theory (Perner, Sprung, Zerner, and Haider, 
2003), he offers an illustrating example in his false-belief 
task Max and the chocolate (Wimmer and Perner, 1983). In 
this story “Max thinks the chocolate is in the cupboard” and 
“Mother knows it’s in the drawer” (Mother switched the 
location of the chocolate from the cupboard to the drawer 
while Max briefly left the room). The statements are equally 
true, in that, although Maxi’s belief that the chocolate is still 
in the cupboard does not comply with reality, his having this 
belief is nonetheless true. In this way, tensed complements 
allow attitude and content of a person’s mental state to be 
separated. The attitude describes the mental state (belief, 
desire, etc.) and the content (attribution) describes what the 
mental state is about (i.e. wanting chocolate).  
In a longitudinal study de Villiers and Pyers, (2002) 
traced the development of the understanding of false beliefs 
and various measures of spontaneous language production 
and comprehension over the course of one year. They found 
that mastery of tensed complements is a precursor and 
possibly even a prerequisite of successful false-belief 
performance5.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  It should be noted here that a distinction ought to be made 
between false-belief understanding and false belief performance. 
However, as the most common way to measure explicit false-belief 
If understanding false beliefs requires a propositional 
structure of a high degree of complexity, it should be 
predicted that children might not understand them unless 
they could also handle language of equivalent complexity. 
This is exactly what many studies involving children with 
language and cognitive impairments show, such as autistic 
spectrum disorder (ASD), or sensory impairment, such as 
deafness or blindness 6 , thus rendering support to the 
linguistic determinism theory (cf. reviews Astington and 
Jenkins (1999) and Garfield, Peterson and Perry (2001), 
anthology Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg, and Cohen (1993), 
or Milligan, Astington and Dack (2007) for a more recent 
meta-analysis). Children with these disorders or functional 
impairments are late in both linguistic and ToM development 
or, as in many ASD cases, never reach a stage where they 
master these skills. 
 Some researchers found that especially the verbs say or 
think seem to give children understanding of a format that is 
needed to represent beliefs as false (de Villiers and de 
Villiers, 2000). Others found that the verb want followed by 
infinitival complements might bias the child’s attention more 
towards the association of false belief and complement 
understanding because this verb makes the desire 
perceptually salient (Ng, Cheung and Xiao, 2010). Other 
studies yet acknowledge the importance of tensed 
complements, but give no support to the role of words like 
say or think (Hale and Tager-Flusberg, 2003; Lohmann and 
Tomasello, 2003).  
Variation in language ability reliably correlates with 
individual differences in ToM. Astington and Jenkins (1999) 
found that the association between early language 
development and advanced false-belief understanding is 
observed even after controlling for individual differences in 
nonverbal intelligence and cognition. According to the 
linguistic determination theory, the far most significant 
factor in predicting success in false-belief test is the 
comprehension and production of sentences containing 
tensed complements (but not the other way around). Given 
this background, an important question at the preschool level 
is whether exposure to explicit metacognitive language will 
result in greater conceptual understanding of one’s own and 
other people’s beliefs. Peskin and Astington (2004) tested 
this and found that children exposed to stories enriched with 
mental verbs exhibited significantly more metacognitive verb 
production, but no improvement in metacognitive compre-
hension. The control group had not been exposed to 
metacognitive language. Instead the children in the control 
group were read stories and shown illustrations that 
implicitly required the children to think about perspectives 
other than their own. The control group outperformed the 
experimental group on a false-belief task battery, suggesting 
that the active construction of one’s own mentalistic 
interpretations from illustrations and text implicitly draw 
attention to mental states.   
Ornaghi, Brockmeier and Gavazzi (2011) interpreted 
these results as evidence that passively listening to stories 
with mental state terms alone is not enough to significantly 
improve understanding of metacognitive language or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
understanding is through false-belief tasks, this distinction will not 
be made here.	  6	  This research is not held within the confines of this paper, but see 
the meta-analysis by Milligan et al. (2007) for autism; Schick, de 
Villiers, de Villiers, and Hoffmeister (2007) for deafness and 
McAlpine and Moore (1995) for blindness.	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accelerate ToM development. They suggested that having to 
actively construct one’s own mentalistic interpretations of 
stories highlighting mental states would be more effective. 
Unlike the Peskin and Astington study, Ornaghi and her 
colleagues specifically encouraged the children in the 
training condition to actively “use mental state talk” 
(ibid.:242) in a set of language games. They found that the 
mean post-test scores of the children in the training condition 
were significantly higher than those of the children in the 
control group on a battery of false-belief tests and on 
metacognitive vocabulary comprehension, thus supporting 
their hypothesis.   
Unfortunately, only children aged three and four were 
included in the study. As children are said to acquire ToM 
around the age of four, five-year-olds should have been 
included in the study. Furthermore, four-year-olds were 
tested on a battery of false-belief tasks, but the three-year-
olds were only tested on the Sally-Anne false-belief test, a 
methodological choice that “was based on the literature, 
which reports that children’s false-belief understanding is 
generally acquired at 4 years of age” (ibid.:233). This makes 
it impossible to compare the two age groups. The three-year-
olds were not tested for false-belief understanding after the 
intervention period, owing to heavily skewed pre-test scores, 
where only one child out of 34 passed the change of location 
test. This means that all the study shows is that four-year-
olds seem to have benefitted from the training in terms of 
enhanced scores on the false-belief tests. Furthermore, the 
training only consisted of making the children use eight 
different mental verbs in ordinary conversation: getting 
scared, getting angry, wanting, remembering, knowing, 
thinking, believing, and deciding. Besides the fact that 
getting scared and getting angry are affective, not cognitive 
verbs, the transcript in the appendix shows that the children 
are only trained in using the verb, not at all in using tensed 
complements. Furthermore, the ecological validity of the 
study is questionable in that "the sessions took place in a 
non-classroom area of the school building that had been 
specially laid out by the researcher" (ibid.: 246). Can 
behaviour in non-classroom environments be generalized to 
classroom areas? 
However, the question whether it is the active production 
of or being passively exposed to that furthers the 
development of ToM is interesting, no matter whether it 
concerns mental verbs or the syntactic structure of tensed 
complements. If comparable at all, I would propose that 
actively producing tensed complements with mental verbs 
would be a little like constructing one’s own mentalistic 
interpretations from illustrations and text, thus implicitly 
drawing attention to mental states, as in the Peskin and 
Astington (2004) study.  
Many studies have explored the effect of sentential 
complements on ToM development, but, to my knowledge, 
so far none have investigated the effect of training typically 
developing children in the active production of tensed 
complements. As this pilot study is a conceptual replication 
of the Ornaghi et al. (2011) study I hypothesize that 
1) Children trained in actively producing tensed 
complements with metal verbs will perform better on ToM 
measuring tasks than their controls who have merely been 
subjected to a passive exposure of the same, and that 
2) Children with low ToM pre-scores will benefit more 
from training than children with high pre-scores.   
2 Method 
Given the limited temporal and economic resources of a 
master’s thesis, the study was a pilot study. Before 
conducting it, approval was applied for at and granted by the 
Regional Ethical Review Board in Lund (exp. 2013/111). 
The study was conducted April-June 2013. 
2.1 Participants 
Participants were recruited from a pre-school in Kävlinge, a 
minor city in the south of Sweden. The city was chosen 
based on geographic and demographic considerations: it is 
close to Lund University and to the national mean figures in 
terms of socio-economic variables (Statistiska centralbyrån, 
2012). Written information about the study and the 
implications for the children was distributed to all guardians 
of children 3-6 years at the pre-school, 91 in number. The 
guardians were also invited to a one-hour information 
meeting. Guardians of 65 children gave their written, 
informed consent to the participation of their child(ren).  
As both the intervention group and the control group 
were exposed to the story telling, it would have been ideal to 
have a second control group who received no story telling 
and no training at all. But as studies involving young 
children by their nature often have a large dropout of 
participants, an initial sample of 65 children did not allow for 
three groups. As expected, a number of children fell long-
term ill during the pre-test period, went on holiday with their 
families or simply refused to participate. The final sample 
thus consisted of 47 participants (26 females, 21 males). 
Fortunately, the dropouts were evenly distributed on the 
intervention and control groups. One child was absent during 
the post-tests; so 46 children completed the investigation 
(Fig. 1), 22 in the intervention group and 24 in the control 
group. Children with an absence rate higher than 25% during 
the intervention period were excluded from the final 
statistical calculations. 
 
 
Fig. 1.  Number of participating children from beginning to end 
The final sample of 47 children was stratified into hi-
ToMs and lo-ToMs based on their pre-scores on the false-true 
belief pre-tests and age (Fig. 2). No consideration was taken 
to the results of the droodle tests (see Material and 
Procedure), as these were not used in the study now 
conceptually replicated. As the number of children was 
limited, the line between hi-ToMs and lo-ToMs was drawn 
between the top 30% (three or four correct answers out of 
four possible) and the bottom 70% (nil, one, or two correct 
answers out of 4 possible). Participants were allocated in 
pairs to the intervention and control groups, respectively, by 
consecutively decreasing age and number of correct answers. 
91 •  91 invited 
65 
•  65 
accept-
ed 
47 
•  18 
drop-
outs 
46	  	   •  1 absent 
33	  	   •  13  >25%  
absent 
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The intervention group and the control group thus ended up 
being as homogeneous as possible. As gender is not known 
to influence ToM at age 3-6 years, this variable was not 
taken into account during the stratification process. 
 	  	  
	  
Fig. 2. Stratification process 
2.2 Material and Procedure 
As the validity of a child’s score on psychological tests is 
threatened by such factors as shyness and unfamiliarity with 
the examiner, the children were given the opportunity to 
acquaint themselves with the experimenter on two occasions 
prior to data collection. To ensure ecological validity of the 
study, all assessments and training sessions were carried out 
in the preschool. The children were assessed one by one in a 
separate space at the children’s respective sections. 
Interventions took place in the playrooms of the respective 
sections. Children not participating in the study were on the 
playground or in other activity rooms. 
The study was divided into three parts: pre-tests, 
intervention phase, and post-tests (Fig.  3). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Fig. 3. Test procedure and running time 
2.2.1 Pre-tests. Pre-tests were conducted during seven 
consecutive weekdays. Each child took all pre-tests within 
the same session. 
2.2.1.1 Language comprehension. To ensure that the 
children were capable of understanding the instructions for 
the ToM tests, they were first tested for general language 
comprehension with the SIT test (Hellquist, 1989) for 3-year-
olds and upwards. There is no Swedish standardized 
language comprehension tests for children as young as 3-6 
years, but the SIT test correlates strongly with the TROG-2 
which is a standardized test for ages 8-10 years and older 
(Aittomäki and Winell, 2011). In both tests the child is 
shown three pictures at a time. The pictures differ in 
grammatically essential items and the child is asked to point 
at the picture that best matches the sentence read aloud by 
the experimenter. Such a sentence could be “these are the 
most” and the child chooses between a picture with two big 
circles, three mid-size circles or five small circles. During the 
tests, each child was instructed to take his or her time 
looking at the pictures and then point at the one he or she 
found to be the best match.   
2.2.1.2 Theory of mind assessment 
2.2.1.2.1 False/true belief tests. Level of ToM (the child’s 
ability to attribute false or true beliefs to others) was assessed 
by means of a false-belief test followed by a true-belief test. 
Both tests were first presented in a non-verbal condition 
where the child was asked to point at the chosen target, 
followed by a verbal condition where the child was asked to 
justify his or her choice. 
False/true-belief tests come in various forms; in this study 
the commonly used ‘change of location’ task was applied. 
Animated versions of the Maxi/mother story based on 
Wimmer and Perner (1983) or the Sally/Anne story based on 
Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith (1985) (Appendix 1) were 
shown on a 13” laptop screen, accompanied by a speaker’s 
voice outlining the plot. In both stories a person hides an 
object in a certain location and leaves the room. While this 
person is away a second person changes the location of the 
hidden object. On the return of first person, the participant is 
asked to predict where this person would look for the hidden 
object. In the true-belief test the first person does not leave 
the room and observes the change of location. A child with a 
fully developed ToM will understand that in the false-belief 
condition, the first person cannot know that the object has 
been displaced and consequently would look for the object at 
its original hiding place. In the true-belief condition the child 
must register that the first person has seen the object being 
displaced and therefore should know its new position. In the 
false-belief condition the child has to understand that its own 
knowledge differs from the knowledge of the first person, 
whereas the child and the first person share the same 
knowledge in the true-belief condition.  
Half the children in the intervention and control groups, 
respectively, were pre-assessed with the Sally/Anne story 
and the other half with the Maxi/Mother story. The stories 
were reversed in the post-assessments. 
 
 2.2.1.2.2 Droodle test. A droodle is a fragment of a 
meaningful picture where the child must distinguish what it 
knows from what it sees (cf. Collot d’Escury-Koenigs, 
1990). Sets of three droodles were used to assess 
participants’ ToM level. All droodles were line drawings in 
A4 format. Set 1 depicted a cat, a flower, and a boat with a 
witch who has fallen overboard, set 2 a bunny, a giraffe, and 
an elephant. As was the case with the false/true-belief test, 
half the children in both intervention and control groups were 
pre-assessed with Set 1 and the other half with Set 2. The 
sets were reversed in the post-assessments.  
The child was first given the complete picture and asked 
to describe what it showed. A thin cardboard sheet, from 
which a square had been cut out, was then placed on top of 
the drawing revealing only a fragment of the complete 
picture (Appendix 1). The child was asked, “What would 
your friend believe this picture shows, if he or she hadn’t 
seen the original picture?” A child with a fully developed 
ToM would understand that not having seen the original 
picture, the friend would say anything coming to mind, 
except the motif of the original picture. In the case of the cat 
where the frame only revealed the tail, a child with a fully 
developed ToM could answer “a sock”. A child that has not 
yet developed ToM would not understand that the friend 
does not share his or her own knowledge and would answer 
“a cat” or “a tail”.  
 
Grouping ToM stratification 
Final 
sample 
47 children 
15 hi-ToMs 
8 inte   
rvention 
7 control 
32 lo-ToMs  
16 
intervention 
16 control 
Pre-tests 
7 days 
•  SIT 
•  False/true belief 
•  Droodles 
Intervention 
7 weeks 
•  Story telling 
•  Training the 
production of 
tensed 
complements 
Post-tests 
4 days 
•  False/true 
belief 
•  Droodles 
	  	   6	  
2.2.2 Post-tests. Post-tests (false/true-belief and droodles) 
were conducted during three consecutive weekdays starting 
the first weekday of the week following the intervention 
period, plus – due to holidays – one weekday one week later. 
Only 5 children were post-tested on the last day.  
 
2.2.3 Scoring.  
2.2.3.1 False/true belief tests. 
Non-verbal: “Point at where you think Sally/Max will 
look for the [object]” 
- false belief, original hiding place: 1p 
- false belief, new hiding place: 0p 
- true belief, original hiding place: 0p 
- true belief, new hiding place: 1 p 
Verbal: “Why would Sally/Max look for the [object] in 
the [location to which the child had pointed]?” 
- false belief, justification of correct target: 1p 
- false belief, justification of incorrect target (or 
“don’t know”): 0p 
- true belief, justification of correct target: 1p 
- true belief, justification of incorrect target (or “don’t 
know”): 0p 
The total maximum score on false/true belief tests 
was 4p. 
2.2.3.2 Droodles:  
- repeating the original interpretation of the picture: 
0p 
- responding with a detail in the original 
interpretation: 0p 
- responding “don’t know”: 1p 
- response ignoring the child’s own knowledge and 
taking the friend’s perspective: 2p 
The total maximum score on a set of three droodles 
was 6p. 
2.2.4 Intervention phase  
The intervention phase consisted of 16 sessions over seven 
weeks, starting the week after pre-tests, on two or three 
consecutive weekdays each week, depending on holidays or 
full-day excursions. In the city of Kävlinge children of 
caregivers out of work or on parental leave are only admitted 
to daycare for 15 hours a week. At the present pre-school 
these hours were scheduled to Tuesday, Wednesday, and 
Thursday mornings, so interventions took place on these 
weekdays only. Each session consisted of a story time in 
which all participating children took part, and a training time 
for children in the intervention condition only.   
Four-year-olds can acquire the ability to offer justi-
fications for a request or reasons for why certain things are as 
they are (why-because) in as short a training period as ten 
minutes a day for four days (McWilliam & Howe, 2004). 
However, because the increased resources in syntactic 
structures expected to provide the format required for the 
representation of mental attitudes towards mental contents 
(she wants that the doll be handed to her) are more 
complicated than those required for expressing causalities 
(she wants the doll because it’s hers), the training was set to 
15 minutes a day for a total of 16 days. This also replicates 
the Ornaghi et al. (2011) study. 
The participating children came from five different 
sections. Three of these were of even size, 11-16 children. 
Children from two smaller sections were added together, 
totalling 14 children, rendering four groups. Half of the 
children in each section were stratified to the intervention 
condition as described above, the other half to the control 
condition. Each session lasted 30 minutes and took place 
between 9 am and noon in one section at a time according to 
a rolling schedule, so that each section was intervened with 
at a different time each day.  
For the intervention phase, seven tales (Carlsson, n.d.) 
were enriched with sentential complements with a variety of 
mental verbs (Appendix 2). The tales were read aloud to the 
children by the experimenter in sessions of 12-13 minutes, 
thus exposing all participating children to an average of 29 
complements per session. After the story reading the children 
in the control condition joined their non-participating peers, 
and the children in the intervention condition stayed on for 
the training. 
The training was arranged as an informal conversation 
about the story just read. During the training the children 
were continuously reminded to use sentential complements 
with whatever mental verb they found relevant. To give all 
children the same opportunities to produce complements, 
less active children were encouraged to speak up and highly 
active children were asked to wait for their turn. During the 
training the children were given illustrations from the stories 
to facilitate conversation and to keep their attention alert. 
The children were asked questions like “What did Felix think 
when he saw the dragon?” and would encourage the children 
to answer, “Felix thought that (att in Swedish) it was 
dangerous” or “he thought that it was dangerous” instead of 
merely “it was dangerous”.  
3 Results 
Although not all children had Swedish as their first language, 
everyone had a normal language comprehension. A couple of 
6-years-olds scored a bit below normal on the SIT test, but as 
they were high in ToM pre-scores, this could be ascribed to 
lack of interest, maybe because they found the SIT test too 
simple. 
Table 1 presents the correlations among the false- and 
true-belief scores in the verbal and non-verbal conditions. 
There is a large correlation (Cohen, 1988:79-81) between 
 
         Table 1. Correlation between false- and true-belief measures on pre- and post-tests.  
 Verbal false-
belief 
Non-verbal 
true-belief 
Verbal true- 
belief 
Pretests    
Non-verbal false-belief .78** .08 .06 
Verbal false-belief - .14 .18 
Non-verbal true-belief  - .91** 
Verbal true-belief   - 
Posttests    
Non-verbal false-belief .92** -.41** -,17 
Verbal false-belief  - - -.44** -.23 
Non-verbal true-belief  - .73** 
Verbal true-belief   - 
                 ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
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Table 2. Improvement in false-belief performance after intervention: all participants (condition 1) and controlled for 
absence >25% during the intervention phase (condition 2). 
 Condition 1  
Number of 
participants 
Condition 2  
Number of 
participants 
  
Intervention 
 
Control 
 
Intervention 
 
Control 
Deterioration 1 0 1 1 0 1 
No change 16 17 33 13 14 27 
Improvement 5 7 12 1 4 5 
Total 22 24 46 15 18 33 
the false-belief scores in the verbal and non-verbal 
conditions in both the pre- and the post-tests (r = .78, N = 56, 
p < .00 and r = .92, N = 46, p < .00, respectively) as well as 
between the true-belief scores in the verbal and non-verbal 
conditions (r = .91, N = 56, p < .00 and r = .73, N = 46, 
p < 0, respectively). However, surprisingly the correlations 
between non-verbal false-belief and verbal and non-verbal 
true-belief conditions are weak (r = .06, and r = .08, 
respectively) and not only weak, but also negative between 
false-belief verbal and true-belief verbal and non-verbal 
(r = -.18 and r = -.14, respectively). In the post-tests all 
correlations are negative and weak, respectively medium 
between false-belief non-verbal and true-belief verbal and 
non-verbal (r = -.17 and r = -.41, respectively) as well as 
between false-belief verbal and true-belief verbal and non-
verbal (r = -.23 and r = -.44, respectively). With this pattern, 
the false-/true-belief scores could not be added to one value 
and as such correlated with the droodle tests, in order to get a 
single measure for ToM level. 
The hypothesized effect of training the active production 
of tensed complements on ToM measures was not found. An 
independent t-test revealed no significant difference in 
improvement between the intervention group and the control 
group, neither in false-belief scores (intervention M = .18, 
SD = .50, control M = .29, SD = .46; t(44) = -.77, p = .44), 
nor in droodle-scores (intervention M = 1, SD = 2.09, control 
M = .12, SD = 2.72; t (44) = 1.23, p = .22). Controlling for 
more than 25% absence during the intervention phase, age, 
gender, and section made no difference to the result. 
Cross tabulations (Table 2) show that the majority of the 
children did not improve at all in false-belief performance 
(33 of 46). As false- and true-belief scores did not correlate 
(Table 1), consideration was given to false-belief 
performance only. One child in the intervention group 
performed worse in the post-test. Five in the intervention 
group and seven in the control group performed better in the 
post-tests. When controlling for absence higher than 25%, 
there was still no change in the majority of children (27 of 
33). One in the intervention group performed worse in the 
post-test, while one in the invention group and four in the 
control group performed better. 
Due to problems with the SPSS software beyond my 
control, I could not analyse the correlations between false- 
and true-belief tests prior to stratification of the children into 
hi-ToMs and lo-ToMs. The later-found lack of correlation 
between the ToM tasks eliminates the possibilities to 
investigate hypothesis 2, as the stratification seems to have 
been done on unreliable data (see 2.1 Participants).  
4 Discussion 
This study renders no support to the hypothesis that training 
the active production of tensed complements accelerates 
ToM development, as measured with false/true-belief tasks. 
However, descriptive statistics indicate that the little 
improvement in the false-belief post-tests that had actually 
occurred was larger in the control group than in the 
intervention group. This may, of course, be owing to pure 
incidence, but it could also have a biological explanation.  
Through childhood, the brain-mass increases during certain 
irregularly occurring periods commonly called growth spurts 
(Epstein, 1979). If the children who did improve their 
false/true-belief performance were in the midst of a growth 
spurt, and if more of these children happened to be in the 
control group, this could explain why the improvements were 
found rather in this group.  However, as this – for obvious 
reasons – cannot be tested, there is little point in pursuing 
this track. 
An alternative reason could be cognitive overload in the 
intervention group. Having to produce the complex syn-
tactical structure of tensed complements may have forced the 
children in this group to concentrate on the format itself, thus 
blocking the acquisition of its implications, namely that a 
belief does not necessarily have to be true. Conversely, the 
children in the control group who merely listened to the story 
may have had sufficient cognitive resources left over to 
implicitly understand the perspective of someone else. This 
would be consistent with Alice Howard Gola’s (2012) 
findings, namely that ToM development in children over-
hearing characters in video format discussing the mental 
states of someone else were scaffolded to a greater extent 
than children interacting with the video. This result may have 
significance for education and the design of study material 
and further studies are needed to explore this particular 
aspect. 
A third and more sociocultural explanation for the failing 
effect of the training  (that does not necessarily exclude any 
of the two others) could be that the link between preschool 
and ToM is either a function of increased exposure to 
language or the result of the overall cognitive complexity of 
the preschool environment per se. The children may already 
have had received all the training they could absorb, leaving 
no room for further improvement. In fact, and quite in line 
with the Vygotskian view, the Swedish National Agency for 
Education (Skolverket) explicitly mandates preschools to 
train the children in social competencies  through a pragmatic 
approach7. I will revert to this point at the end of the dis-
cussion. 
 
4.1 Methodological considerations 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  ”The preschool must encourage and strengthen the child’s 
compassion and empathy with other people’s situation” (Skolverket, 
2011:4),  ”…shall strive to ensure that every child develops a 
capacity for listening, reflecting, and expressing its own perceptions 
and endeavors to understand others’ perspectives” (ibid.:9), and 
”Children acquire ethic values and norms primarily through 
concrete experiences.” (ibid.:4). My translations. 	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4.1.1. Correlation between false- and true belief tasks. It 
was a surprise that the false- and true-belief scores did not 
correlate. The stories are the same, except from the fact that 
in the true condition the child knows that Sally/Max has seen 
the ball/chocolate being displaced. Sharing the knowledge of 
Sally/Max should result in better performance, but it did not 
in the pre-tests.  
I see two possible methodological reasons for this. One 
could be that each participating child was tested in his or her 
own section to make the children feel as comfortable with 
the situation as possible and to ensure ecological validity. It 
was not possible to prevent the children from exchanging 
experiences, which may have resulted in competition 
between the children. Although they were explicitly 
instructed to concentrate and to take their time, utterances 
like “Huh, it was a piece of cake!” or “I was really quick!” 
were commonly heard among the children. This could have 
spurred the children not yet assessed to speed up their 
performance at the cost of accuracy. Having the children 
perform the tasks in laboratory environments could have 
prevented them from communicating directly after having 
done their tasks. On the other hand, it would implicate a loss 
of ecological validity, as there is a risk that results will 
diverge in the two settings. Besides, some degree of 
competition is part of children’s everyday experience, as we 
– regardless of age – construe our social self by comparing 
ourselves with other people (Festinger, 1954; see also Suls 
and Wheeler, 2000; Wood, 1996). 
A second, and perhaps more likely, reason for the lacking 
correlation between false- and true-belief tasks could be that 
the children watched the films sequentially, with no pause or 
distraction between them. After the false-belief condition had 
been shown, the children were instructed: “You will now see 
a short film which is similar to the one you have just seen. 
But there are some differences and therefore you must watch 
and listen carefully”. Nevertheless, the children could very 
well have been distracted or confused, mixing up the films. 
Future studies would gain from adding a pause or filler task 
between the false- and the true-belief tasks. 
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the weak correlations 
of the pre-tests turned into medium negative correlations in 
the post-test. This could indicate that the children were less 
concentrated, and maybe more eager to ‘get out of there’ 
during the post-tests than during the pre-tests. The post-tests 
were carried out at the beginning of June, with holidays 
coming up and many special activities going on at the 
preschool. What child would miss out on an ice cream in 
favour of looking at the same old film twice? Full-scale 
studies should avoid the months of May and June. 
 
4.1.2 Droodles. The commonly used false-belief task 
battery consists of change-of-location, change-of-content and 
appearance/reality tasks that are quite alike in their structure. 
They are presented in the form of narratives and have been 
criticized for testing children’s narrative competencies rather 
than their false-belief understanding (cf. Bloom and German, 
2000). During the planning of the study droodles therefore 
seemed a good alternative. However, the scores on this test 
turned out to be unexpectedly low, indicating a floor effect. 
Indeed, it seems that four- to six-year-olds tend to behave as 
if seeing only a part of an object is sufficient for someone 
else to share the children’s own knowledge about the object’s 
identity. Only at the age of six or even seven they tend to get 
this right and understand that a person cannot be certain of an 
object’s identity when only a detail of it is visible (Lalonde 
and Chandler, 2002; Taylor, 1988). Why is this so? 
I propose that the negation “if your friend hadn’t seen 
that [original] picture…” makes the child get lost in a verbal 
description that demands too much cognitive processing for 
ages younger than six or seven. I leave it to linguistics to say 
more about children’s mastering of negations and suffice to 
say that with this experience to hand droodles should not be 
used in studies incorporating pre-schoolers. 
 
4.1.3 Sample size, baseline levels, and scores. Full-scale 
studies should have a much larger sample which – in order to 
establish the role of the preschool environment in ToM 
development – should include children whose day-care is 
other than preschool.  Participants should preferably be 
recruited from different socio-economic districts, as 
complexity of parental interaction with the children may vary 
with the parents’ educational level. Polarized samples would 
make possible socio-economically based developmental 
differences more apparent than their average correspondents. 
Also, with a larger sample individual differences in health 
and general shape of the day would even out. 
Within-subject designs in which each participant 
contributes many data points to each condition are more 
powerful and tend to produce more reliable outcomes. With 
repeated measures, it is possible to obtain a more precise 
estimate of performance in each condition, at least in the pre-
tests. Future studies would gain credibility with such baseline 
measurements.  
Additionally, the results exhibited some rather large 
standard deviations in the false-/true-belief tests. This is 
likely to be due to the binary scores (correct or incorrect). A 
finer graded scoring procedure would allow for a more 
nuanced picture of the distribution and is as such to be 
recommended.  
Finally, the non-verbal condition of this study is still an 
elicited response and thus measures explicit ToM. 
Measurement of implicit false-belief understanding in full-
scale studies, for instance by means of eye tracking, would 
add a variable and thereby make the study less sensitive to 
effect size.  
4.2 Theoretical implications 
Pilot studies are not meant to render generalizable results. 
They are meant to reveal weaknesses of the design of the 
study and problems with its implementation. But even if a 
pilot study by its very nature suffers from some 
shortcomings, the result of this study may have implications 
for the theory-theory8 that are worthwhile following up in 
full-scale studies. 
Whereas mainstream psychology still finds that the 
development of ToM as measured by false-belief tasks is 
some kind of milestone marking the entry into an adult folk 
psychology, the much later acquisition of droodle 
understanding could indicate that there are at least two 
watershed events: the mastering of false-belief tasks and the 
mastering of droodle tasks. But folk psychology is not just 
about understanding that people hold beliefs that might be 
false. It is also about telling lies, having secrets, pretending, 
deceiving, teasing, using irony, and repairing 
misunderstandings. Those are not activities that are off 
during infancy and become turned on around the age of four. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  The theory that we hold theories of other people’s mental states.	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Those are activities that children practice from early infancy, 
interacting with others in pragmatic contexts. 
The human endeavour to categorize and label phenomena 
allows no conceptual spaces between categories, so we create 
demarcation lines to keep them apart. In the case of ToM, 
these lines implicate an initiation into another stage in a 
hierarchical developmental system. At the same time a 
growing body of evidence shows that young infants are 
capable of grasping the intentions of others through the 
perception of bodily movements, gestures, facial expressions, 
and the similar actions (cf. Trevarthan, 1979; Trevarthen and 
Aitken, 2001). We thus have a problem that the theory-
theory does not explain. Rather, it has forced us to resort to a 
number of post hoc speculations, like for instance the notion 
of implicit or unconscious ToM. 
The concept of ToM is in trouble. It appears unlikely that 
Understanding and explaining human behaviour should be 
based on the existence of some dedicated mind reading 
mechanism, or forged by some theorizing function. Could it 
be that we have become obsessed by the form of language, 
rather than observing what language is used for? What if 
linguistic capacity is simply the result of children beginning 
to participate in conversations that require recognition of 
conflicts of view? On consideration, how often – and when – 
do we explicitly think about other people’s beliefs and 
desires? In everyday life we probably do not, not until 
discrepancies between what we expect from experience and 
what we observe become salient. When the child experiences 
such dissonance it will probably react in a way that 
encourages adults to engage in explanatory conversations 
with the child that help the child to “make sense of actions in 
terms of reason” (Gallagher and Hutto, 2008:7). 
I will not rule out that syntactical training might enhance 
folk psychology in older children, but I find it much more 
plausible that understanding the meaning of mental 
terminology depends on the concept of the Wittgensteinian 
language games that “bring into prominence the fact that the 
speaking of language is part of an activity, or a form of life” 
(PI 23, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, n.d.), rather 
than on a syntactical reference to an inner state. We might be 
looking at an inseparable mix of biology, evolution, and 
socializing, offering a world of new explorations. 
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Appendix 1 
 
 
                                    
  
 
Max-Mother  
False-belief condition in Swedish (53 seconds): 
Det här är Max. Max har fått en chokladkaka av sin pappa. 
Max ska lägga undan chokladkakan i köket så att han kan äta 
den efter maten. Max öppnar skåpet i köket och lägger in 
chokladkakan. Sedan stänger Max skåpet igen. Max går nu 
iväg för att tvätta sina händer inför middagen [lämnar köket]. 
Under tiden Max tvättar sina händer hittar mamman 
chokladkakan i skåpet. Mamma [kommer in i köket] tar 
chokladkakan och lägger den i lådan istället, så att den inte 
ska smälta i det varma skåpet [lämnar köket]. Nu har Max 
snart ätit färdigt [kommer in köket igen]. Undrar var Max 
kommer att leta efter sin chokladkaka? 
 
False-belief condition in English: 
This is Max. Max got a chocolate bar from his dad. Max puts 
the chocolate bar away so that he can eat it after dinner. Max 
opens the cupboard in the kitchen and puts in the chocolate 
bar. Max then closes the cupboard again. Max goes away in 
order to wash his hands before dinner [leaves kitchen]. While 
Max is away, Mum [enters kitchen] finds the chocolate bar in 
the cupboard. Mum takes the chocolate bar and puts it in the 
drawer so that it won’t melt in the hot cupboard. Now Max 
has finished dinner [enters kitchen]. I wonder where Max is 
going to look for his chocolate? 
  
True-belief condition in Swedish (53 seconds): Det här är 
Max. Max har fått en chokladkaka av sin pappa. Max ska 
lägga undan chokladkakan i köket så att han kan äta den efter 
maten. Max öppnar skåpet i köket och lägger in 
chokladkakan. Sedan stänger Max skåpet igen. Max går nu 
iväg för att tvätta sina händer inför middagen [lämnar köket 
och kommer tillbaka]. När max kommer tillbaka till köket 
ser han sin mamma [kommer in i köket]. Mamma tar 
chokladkakan och lägger den i lådan istället, så att den inte 
ska smälta i det varma skåpet [båda lämnar köket]. Nu har 
Max snart ätit färdigt [kommer in köket igen]. Undrar var 
Max kommer att leta efter sin chokladkaka.  
 
True-belief condition in English: 
This is Max. Max got a chocolate bar from his dad. Max puts 
the chocolate bar away so that he can eat it after dinner. Max 
opens the cupboard in the kitchen and puts in the chocolate 
bar. Max then closes the cupboard again. Max goes away in 
order to wash his hands before dinner [leaves kitchen and 
comes back]. When Max comes back, he sees Mum [enters 
kitchen]. Mum finds the chocolate bar in the cupboard. Mum 
takes the chocolate bar and puts it in the drawer so that it 
won’t melt in the warm cupboard [both leave kitchen]. Max 
has finished dinner [enters kitchen]. I wonder where Max is 
going to look for his chocolate? 
                           
Sally-Anne 
False-belief condition in Swedish (43 seconds): 
Det här är Sally och Anne. Sally står upp och lekar med en 
boll. Anne sitter ner och tittar på när Sally lekar med bollen. 
Nu ropar fröken på Sally [röst i bakgrunden: Sally, kan du 
komma hit]. Sally lägger bollen i korgen och täcker över den 
med en filt. Sally går iväg för att se vad fröken vill [lämnar]. 
Under tiden tar busiga Anne bollen ur korgen. Anne lägger 
den i lådan och sätter på locket [lämnar]. Efter en stund 
kommer Sally tillbaka igen [kommer tillbaka]. Undrar var 
hon kommer att leta efter sin boll? 
 
False-belief condition in English: 
This is Sally and Anne. Sally is standing up and plays with a 
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ball. Anne is sitting down and watches Sally playing with the 
ball. Now the teacher asks Sally to come to her [voice in the 
background: Sally, please come here]. Sally puts the ball in 
the basket and covers it with a blanket. Sally leaves to find 
out what the teacher wants [leaves]. While Sally is away, 
teasing Anne takes the ball out of the basket. Anne puts the 
ball in the box and puts on the lid [leaves]. After a while, 
Sally comes back [enters]. I wonder where she is going to 
look for her ball? 
 
True-belief condition in Swedish (45 seconds): 
Det här är Sally och Anne. Sally står upp och lekar med en 
boll. Anne sitter ner och tittar på när Sally lekar med bollen.  
Sally lägger bollen i korgen och täcker över den med en filt. 
Busiga Anne tar bollen ur korgen. Anne lägger den i lådan 
och sätter på locket [lämnar]. Nu ropar fröken på Sally [röst i 
bakgrunden: Sally, kan du komma hit]. Sally går iväg för 
att se vad fröken vill [lämnar]. Efter en stund kommer Sally 
tillbaka igen [kommer tillbaka]. Undrar var hon kommer att 
leta efter sin boll?  
 
True-belief condition in English: 
This is Sally and Anne. Sally is standing up and plays with a 
ball. Anne is sitting down and watches Sally playing with the 
ball. Sally puts the ball in the basket and covers it with a 
blanket. Teasing Anne takes the ball out of the basket. Anne 
puts the ball in the box and puts on the lid [leaves]. Now the 
teacher asks Sally to come to her [voice in the background: 
Sally, please come here]. Sally leaves to find out what the 
teacher wants [leaves]. After a while, Sally comes back 
[enters]. I wonder where she is going to look for her ball?
  
 
Droddles – Ship/witch example 
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Appendix 2 
Number of sentential complements with mental verbs per story: 
Verb / Story 
Gammal-
gäddan 
Ballong-
färden 
Troll-
drycken Elvira 
Rädd-
haran Draken Presenten Total 
ana att have a 
feeling that 
     
1 
 
1 
berätta att tell that 
 
1 
 
3 1 2 3 10 
bestämma att 
decide that 2 3 2 
 
2 2 2 13 
fundera att wonder 
that 
    
1 1 
 
2 
föreslå att suggest 
that 
 
1 
 
1 
   
2 
förklara att explain 
that 
     
1 
 
1 
förstå att 
understand that 
  
3 7 5 7 2 24 
försöka att try to  
   
1 
 
1 
 
2 
gilla att like that 
    
2 1 
 
3 
gissa att guess that 
   
1 
 
1 
 
2 
glädja sig att be 
happy that 
    
1 
  
1 
glömma att forget 
that 4 1 4 
   
1 10 
gäspa att yawn that 
     
1 
 
1 
hoppas att hope 
that 
  
4 
  
1 1 6 
höra att hear that 
   
3 1 4 
 
8 
inse att realize that 
   
1 1 2 
 
4 
kolla att check that 
     
2 
 
2 
komma ihåg att 
remember that 5 1 2 
 
1 3 
 
12 
komma på att find 
out that 
     
1 
 
1 
känna att 3 1 3 10 11 14 8 50 
lista ut att 
understand that 
 
1 
     
1 
lova att promise 
that 
   
1 2 2 
 
5 
läsa att read that 
   
1 
   
1 
mena att think that 
     
1 
 
1 
märka att feel that 
  
1 2 3 3 
 
9 
nicka att nod that 
     
1 
 
1 
påminna att remind 
that 
    
1 
  
1 
ropa att shout that 
  
1 
    
1 
se att see that 1 2 2 2 5 7 2 21 
skrika att yell that 
  
1 2 
 
1 
 
4 
skymta att see 
dimly that 
   
1 
   
1 
stå att stand that 1 
      
1 
sucka att sigh that 
    
1 
  
1 
säga att say that 8 9 12 6 1 8 2 46 
tro att believe that 6 
 
6 1 2 10 
 
25 
trösta att comfort 
that 
    
1 
  
1 
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Verb/Story 
  
Gammal-
gäddan 
Ballong-
färden 
Troll-
drycken Elvira 
Rädd-
haran Draken 
 
Presenten Total 
tycka att think that 9 13 7 7 9 11 14 70 
tänka att think that 
 
6 5 5 5 
 
2 23 
uppfatta att 
understand that 
    
1 
  
1 
upptäcka att 
discover that 5 3 5 2 2 8 
 
25 
vara rädd att be 
afraid that 
 
1 
    
3 4 
vara säker att be 
sure that 
    
3 3 
 
6 
vara övertygad att 
be convinced that 
    
1 
  
1 
varna att warn that 
     
1 
 
1 
veta att know that 4 2 7 3 8 4 
 
28 
vilja att want that 
 
3 3 2 1 1 1 11 
visa sig att turn out 
that 
     
1 
 
1 
viska att whisper 
that 
 
4 2 1 
 
1 
 
8 
önska att wish that 
 
  2    1 3 6 
 
48 52 72 63 72 109 44 460 
 
 
